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NOTES
IMPEACHMENT OF JURY VERDICTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Ford Motor Credit Company v. Amodt,' was submitted
to the jury in the form of a special verdict. In controversy was a ques-
tion which read "If you answer question number one 'yes,' then was
the automobile sold and delivered to Earl Amodt for value?" All the
jurors answered "no" to the question. Upon return to the courtroom
the verdict was read aloud, filed, and the jury was dismissed. There had
been no request by counsel to have the individual members polled. Sub-
sequently, the defendant moved for a new trial on the basis that some
jurors were involved in improper activities during the deliberation of
the jury The defendant submitted the affidavits of eight jurors stating,
in substance, that their answer to the question concerning the sale of
the automobile for value was erroneously entered in the special verdict
and the jury foreman had produced items which had not been introduced
in evidence for the inspection of the jury panel during deliberations.
The trial court granted a new trial stating that the written verdict
was not the actual verdict of the jury, that matters and objects not in-
troduced into evidence may have had an unfavorable effect on the
defendant, and that the entry of judgment in accordance with the writ-
ten verdict would result in a miscarriage of justice. From the trial court's
decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which,
in rendering its opinion, made two significant holdings affecting prior
Wisconsin law
The first holding overruled Wolfgram v Schoepke2 which had
carved out a major exception to the general rule barring jurors from
invalidating their own verdict by permitting them to show that their
verdict was mistakenly recorded. Wolfgram provided that jurors could
impeach their verdict by "(S)howing that the words used in convey-
ing it to the court, or enrolling it on the records, by mistake of the per-
son writing them, fail to express the conclusion reached by all the
jurymen."3 In abandoning the Wolfgram exception, the court, upon
careful reflection, stated that the continuance of that exception would
cause more injustice than it could cure. As a result, the general rule-
the foreclosing of jurors from impeaching their verdict-now applies
with equal constraint to the assertion that an answer has been improp-
erly recorded. Under Ford a juror may not challenge the verdict once
the jury has been discharged, whether such challenge be based on his
own misconduct or a claimed erroneous recordation.
129 Wis. 2d 441, 139 N.W.2d 6 (1966).
2 123 Wis. 19, 100 N.W 1054 (1904)
3 Id. at 26, 100 N.W at 1057
With Wolfgrarn overruled, there is even greater significance to the
proceedings which occur in the courtroom at the time the verdict is
returned. Counsel must now recognize that belated efforts to attack the
recordation will be unavailing-if any doubt exists, a polling of the jury
should be made. If the attorney is not present when the jury returns
the verdict, it will be interpreted as a waiver of his right to challenge
the accuracy of the inscription.4
The second major declaration by the court was that, while a juror
may never impeach his verdict, "(I)n some situations jurors may
properly be subject to interrogation by the court to determine if an
irregularity occurred " However, the court immediately qualified
this procedure
(T)rial courts should limit such inquiries to those cases in
which the court is persuaded (1) that the substantial personal
awareness of the alleged impropriety is within the direct and
independent knowledge of one who did not serve as a member
of the jury, (2) that such knowledge was not derived by such
person from a juror after the jury's discharge, and (3) that the
challenge to the integrity of the verdict originated from such
person rather than from a juror.
In summary, jurors may bi required to confirm or deny someone else's
attack upon their verdict, but may never independently impeach their
verdict.
The court further clarified the meaning of its decision in Ford in
Miller v Illinozs Central Railroad.7 In Miller, affidavits had been sub-
mitted by a juror and the plaintiff charging jury misconduct outside
and within the jury room. The affidavits declared that certain jurors
viewed the scene of the accident without court permission and that one
juror sought an opinion of a non-juror relating to the accident. Fur-
thermore, the affidavits recited that the jurors had discussed the case
during the trial before all the evidence was in, and that some jurors
did not fully understand the court's instructions.
Previous to the Ford decision, the general rule (a jury verdict may
not be impeached or attacked by affidavits of a juror) applied only to
deliberations of the jury after the case had been submitted to it.' Pep-
percorn v. Black River Falls9 had established that jurors' misconduct
outside the courtroom could be proven by a juror's affidavit for the
impeachment of the verdict. The proof of the attack on the verdict
4 High v. Johnson, 28 Wis. 72 (1871) (received and recorded), Alusa v. Lehigh
Valley Ry. Co., 26 F.2d 950 (1928), Reed v. Cook, 103 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1959)
failure to make timely demand), see 71 A.L.R.2d 640 (1960), Wis. P1. &
Pr. § 34.50 (1954).
529 Wis. 2d at 450, 139 N.W.2d at 11.6Id.
736 Wris. 2d 184, 152 N.W.2d 898 (1967).




did not seem to depend upon who initiated the attack or whether such
knowledge was derived prior to the discharge of the jury
In Miller, the plaintiff had argued that Ford only eliminated the
Wolfgram exception, and that it was silent about misconduct occurring
outside the courtroom. Since Peppercorn, which held the affidavits
competent, was not, mentioned in the Ford decision, the plaintiff rea-
soned that Peppercorn remained law in Wisconsin." However, the
court did not agree with this contention. Rather, it had been declared
in Ford that neither the type nor place of misconduct was controlling,
but whether the testimony or affidavit was competent and admissible.
In commenting upon what Ford had established, the court stated
In Ford we recognized there were existing cases outside of the
old rule in which jury verdicts might be impeached through the
initiation of a third person, such as a clerk of the court or baliff,
in which jurors' affidavits or testimony was necessary To give
greater dignity and finality to jury verdicts, we, in effect restrict-
ed these types of cases by extending or enlarging the old rule
so as to include any impeachment of a verdict based upon mis-
conduct of a juror occurring at any time whether in the court-
room, outside the courtroom, or during deliberations 11
The court further indicated that the deliberate language of Ford on the
subject was and is sufficient to overrule, sub silento, inconsistent hold-
ings or language of prior cases.1
2
II. HISTORICAL ORIGIN AND POLICY BAsIs FOR THE RULE
OF EXCLUSION
The oft quoted rule that jurors may not be heard to impeach their
own verdict originated in Lord Mansfield's extension of the doctrine
that a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude. The first
case to state the rule that a juror may not impeach his verdict was Vaise
v. Delaval
The court cannot receive such an affidavit from any Qf the jury-
men themselves, in all of whom such conduct is a very high mis-
demeanor, but in every such case the Court must derive their
knowledge from some other source such as some person having
seen the transaction through a window or by some other means."3
Prior to this decision the unquestioned practice had been to receive
jurors' affidavits without scruple, both in English and American prac-
tice.' 4 In Norman v. Beamont,'5 decided prior to Vaise, the court stated
10 Brief for Appellant at 15-17, Miller v. Illinois R.R., 36 Wis. 2d 184, 152 N.W.2d
898 (1967).
11 Miller v. Illinois Central R.R., 36 Wis. 2d at 193, 152 N.W.2d at 902.
"2 The principles announced in Ford and Miller have been adhered to in a sub-
sequent case. See Boller v. Cofrances, 42 Wis. 2d 170, 166 N.W.2d 129 (1969).
1 Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785).
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that "(I)n cases of this sort where the objection could not appear of
record, we always admitted of affidavits-as in respect to a misbehavior
of any of the jury, or any declaration made by any of them, either be-
fore or after the verdict to show that a jury man was partial."'-6 But
with the strength of Lord Mansfield's declaration, the doctrine became
accepted law in England and the United States.
Justification for this rule has been largely based on policy reasons."
Without the prohibition there would exist a situation so vulnerable to
fraud, corruption, and perjury as to greatly impair the value, if not the
eventual destruction, of trial by jury. s In McDonald v. Pless,19 the
United States Supreme Court stated that the prohibition was based on
the controlling policy which selects the lesser of two evils in choosing
between redressing injury to the litigant and injuring the public by
permitting jurors to testify as to what happened in the jury room.
The secrecy of jury deliberations is the primary policy reason neces-
sitating the exclusion. The strength of the secrecy policy was illustrated
by the furor that arose when it became known that wire recordings
of jury deliberations were being conducted in connection with the Uni-
versity of Chicago Jury Research Project conducted in 1955. There-
after, the practice was condemned and it became a federal crime,20
punishable by imprisonment for one year and a fine of one thousand
dollars, to record or attempt to record the proceeding of any federal
grand jury or petit jury or to listen to or observe or attempt to listen
or observe the deliberation of which the actor is not a member.
Furthermore, the rule of exclusion seeks to promote the free discussion
and interchange of opinion among jurors and to guard the finality of
14 English practice, see: Dent v. Hertford, 2 Salk 645, 91 Eng. Rep. 546 (K.B.
1696), Metcalfe v. Deane, Cro. Eliz. 189, 78 Eng. Rep. 445 (Q.B. 1590).
Amerzcan practice, see: Talmadge v. Northrup, 1 Root 522 (Conn. 1793),
Grinnel v. Phillips, 1 Mass. 530 (1805), Smith v. Cheetham, 3 Cai R. 57(N.Y.1805), Bradley v. Bradley, 4 Dall. 112 (Pa. 1792).
15 Norman v. Benmont Willes 484, 125 Eng. Rep. 1281 (C.P 1744).
16 Id.
17 See: Corruption of jury-Straker v. Graham, 150 Eng. Rep. 1612 (Ex. 1839).
Undermining finality of the verdict-Caldwell v. F E. Spears & Sons, 186
Ky. 64, 216 S.W 83 (1919).
Post verdict tampernig-Haight v. Turner, 21 Conn. 593 (1852), People v.
Pizzino, 313 Mich. 97, 20 N.W.2d 824 (1945), State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St.
423, 48 N.E.2d 861 (1943), Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (1964).
Testimony likely to be perlured-Northern Pac. Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199
(C.A. 9th 1954).
Invading secrecy and privacy of jury deliberations-Remmer v. United States,
347 U.S. 227 (1954), Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933), N.L.R.B. v.
Botany Worsted Mills, 106 F.2d 263 (C.A. 3rd 1939), Rakes v. United States,
169 F.2d 739 (4th Cir. 1948), Sineri v. Smilkstem & Son slnc., 132 N.Y.S.2d
475 (1954), Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio St. 235, 187, N.E. 862 (1933).
Note 15 TEXAs L. Rrv. 101 (1936).
18 Johnson v. Davenport, 26 Ky. 261 (1830).
19 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
2018 U.S.C.A. § 1508 (1956), see Cal. Pen. Code § 167, 13 HASTINGS L. J. 490
(1962).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
jury verdicts. In Pless the court indicated that if verdicts, which were
solemnly made and publicly returned, could be attacked and set aside
by those who participated in their making, the result would be to make
what was intended to be a private deliberation the constant subject of
public investigation-to the destruction of all frankness and freedom of
discussion.21 Thus, the rule seeks to protect jurors from harassment
and annoyance by the defeated party in an effort to secure some evi-
dence which might establish misconduct to set aside the verdict.
It has been stated that experience would show that the admissibility
of affidavits of jurors would more likely lead to the prevention rather
that the promotion of the discovery of the truth in a judicial process
based upon the jury system.22
Courts have also applied the more standard rules of evidence to
exclude affidavits of jurors. The basic principle of evidence which
prohibits the introduction of such affidavits is the parole evidence rule.
Wigmore has stated that
The principle is that where the existence and tenor of a jural act
-an utterance to which legal effects are attached-are in issue,
the outward utterance as finally and formally made, and not
the prior and private intention is taken as exclusively constituting
the act and therefore where the act is required to be made in
writing, the writing is the act.
2
3
Thus, jurors' deliberations, arguments, expressions, beliefs and motives
represent a state of mind which must precede every legal act, and are
merged into and support the integrated intention embodied in the
verdict. The verdict, as finally agreed upon and pronounced by the
jurors in open court, must be taken to be the best evidence of their
beliefs and, therefore conclusive.24
The principle is analogous to the situation where prior negotiations
of the parties to a contract will disappear from legal consideration when
once the final agreement is reduced to writing and signed. Thus, the
disclosure of prior negotiations is forbidden because of the
(1) Loss of all certainty in the verdict,
(2) Impractibility of seeking for definiteness in the preliminary
views,
(3) Risk of misrepresentation after disclousre of the verdict, and
(4) Impossibility of expecting any end to trials if the grounds
for the verdict were allowed to effect its overthrow 25
However, assuming that the act was the juror's legal act, there is
nothing to prohibit investigation with respect to disclosures of irregu-
21238 U.S. at 267-268.
22 Blodgett v. Park, 76 N.H. 435, 84 A. 42 (1912).
23 8 WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2348 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
24 Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass. 156 (1839)
25 Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897 (1958)
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larities and misconduct of jurors during their deliberations which con-
stitute deviations from those certain formalities that are regarded as
desirable policy-wise in the conduct of jury deliberations.
A second exception to the parole evidence rule is the correction
of a mistake in the jury's uttered verdict in the form of an improper
entry by the clerk in court. This exception is based upon the same
principle as the reformation of a deed in equity for mutual mistake, so
as to make it correspond to the prior expressed agreement of the parties.
A second evidentary principle upon which the rule of exclusion is
based is that of privileged communication. Basically, four requirements
must be present for a privileged communication to exist.
1. The communication originates in a confidence of secrecy,
2. Confidence is essential to the attainment of the purpose,
3. The relationship is entitled to protection,
4. Injury from disclosure overbalances the benefits gained,
As Wigmore has stated in regard to the fulfillment of the four require-
ments for a privileged communication.
"The communication originates in a confidence of secrecy, this
confidence is essential to the due attainment of the jury's con-
stitutional purpose, the relation of jurors is clearly entitled to
the highest consideration and the most careful protection, and
the injury from disclosure would certainly overbalance the
benefits thereby "26
Thus, the privileged communications rule is applied to jury de-
liberations so as to forbid disclosure to third persons of communications
with fellow jurors made during their retirement. As Cardozo has
stated, the "freedom of debate might be stifled and independence of
thought checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and
ballots were to be freely published to the world.
27
In practice, the privileged communications rule is seldom used
because what is said between jurors is seldom relevant upon a new trial
and what is disclosed in an affidavit is usually not in the nature of
communication, but rather a statement of misconduct which is not
always protected by the principle of privilege. Furthermore, the courts
have favored public policy arguments as grounds for exclusion. These
arguments seem to be indistinguishable from the fourth requirement
of a privileged communication which balances secrecy against the bene-
fits of disclosure.
III. CLASSIFICATION AND CRITICISM OF THE RULE
Reported cases in American jurisdictions which have examined
attempts to impeach a jury verdict by affidavit or testimony of a juror
26 8 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 2346 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
27 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
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can be classified into four areas (1) matters personal to the juror
which "inhere in the verdict", (2) irregularities occurring in the jury
room during the period of deliberation, (3) objective conduct or "overt
acts" of a juror outside the courtroom, and (4) any matter concerning
the juror or his verdict in jurisdictions where there is a total exclusion
(self stultifying testimony doctrine)
Under the first classification, attempts to impeach a verdict by
showing a juror's mental operations and emotions resulting from speci-
fied events occurring during the jury deliberations are almost universal-
ly prohibited."' Thus evidence of matters personal to the jurors which
are said to "inhere in the verdict" remain inviolate. As a result, a motion
to set aside a verdict and a plea for a new trial, will not be granted
when based solely upon the following circumstances
1. That one or more of the jurors misunderstood the trial court's
instructions ;29
2. That one or more jurors were influenced by an illegal paper or
an improper remark by a fellow juror ;30
3. That one or more of the jurors intended something different
from what he found by the verdict ;31
4. That one or more of the jurors assented because of weariness
or illness ;32
5. That one or more of the jurors had been influenced by inad-
missible evidence ;33 or
6. That the verdict was predicated upon mistake. 34
28 Bd. of Trustees Eloy Elementary School Dist. v. McEwen, 6 Ariz. App.
148, 430 P.2d 729 (1967), Wright v. Illinois Central and Mississippi Tel.
Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866)-"being personal to each juror, the working of the
mind of any of them cannot be subjected to the test of other testimony "
Kincaid v. Wade, 196 Kan. 174, 410 P.2d 333 (1966), Rhodes v. Liberty Weld-
ing Works, 391 S.W.2d 796 (1965) , Howard v. Bolin Warehouse, Inc., 422
S.W.2d 489 (1967), Note 5 Am. JuR. TRIAL § 1105, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2349 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
29 People v. Jones, 32 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1963), Turner v. State, 99 Fla. 246, 126
So. 158 (1930), Smith v. Eames, 4 Ili. 76, Collings v. Northwestern Hosp.,
202 Minn. 139, 277 N.W 910 (1938), Hamblin v. State, 81 Neb. 148, 115 N.W
850 (1908), Bragg v. King, 104 N.J.L. 4, 139 A. 884 (1928), Schultz v. Catlin,
78 Wis. 611,47 N.W 946 (1891).
3ONorthern Pac. Ry. v. Mely, 219 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1954), People v. Zelver,
135 Cal. App.2d 226, 287 P.2d 183 (1955), Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158
So. 89 (1935), State v. Bayhm, 40 Idaho 536, 234 P 157 (1925), Newton v.
State, 61 Okla. 237, 71 P.2d 122 (1937) , Palmer v. Poynter, 24 Ill. App.2d 68,
163 N.E.2d 851 (1960), Hughes v. State, 126 Tenn. 40, 148 S.W 543 (1912),
State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 103 P 420 (1909).
31 Hendrix v. United States, 219 U.S. 79 (1910), Abraham v. Superior Ct., 50
R.I. 207, 146 A. 617 (1930).
32United States v. Pleva, 66 F.2d 529 (2nd Cir. 1933), State v. Hook, 176 Minn.
604, 224 N.W 144 (1929) , Fitzgerald v. Clark, 17 Mont. 100, 42 P 273 (1895).
33 Poindexter v. Groves, 197 F.2d 915 (2nd Cir. 1952), Burns v. Vaughn, 216
Ark. 128, 224 S.W.2d 365 (1949), People v. Azoff, 105 Cal. 632, 39 P 59,(1895), Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884), contra. Estate of Murray,
283 Iowa 112, 26 N.W.2d 58 (1947)
34Young v. United States, 163 F.2d 187 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
770 (1947), Bateman v. Donovan, 131 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1942), Marconi v.
MacElliott, 8 N.J. Misc. 69, 148 A. 392 (1930)
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Lord Mansfield's exclusion rule has likewise been applied to bar
the introduction of affidavits or testimony of a juror to prove the exist-
ence of irregularities in the jury room during the period of deliberation.
However, such application has not gone without substantial criticism
and dissent. In Crawford v. State,35 one of the earliest cases to criticize
the rule, the court believed that to exclude a juror's testimony or affi-
davit concerning irregularities, would result in the exclusion of the
best, if not the only, evidence of misconduct. The court, in reaching
its conclusion, rejected the prevalent fear about tampering with a ver-
dict on the grounds that the danger is imaginary and secondly that
jurors, in general, are above attacks of this sort.
The major attack on the applicability of the Mansfield rule in the
second class of cases has been spearheaded by Wright v. Illinois Cen-
tral and Mississppi Telegraph Company.3 6 In Wright the court, in
declaring the "Iowa Rule", 37 stated that: "(A)ffidavits of jurors may
be received for the purpose of avoiding a verdict to show any matter
occurring during the trial or in the jury room which does not inhere
in the verdict. ' 38 While the rule still prohibits affidavits or testimony
concerning matters which "inhere in the verdict," such as showing that
one juror did not assent in the verdict, or that he misunderstood the
instructions or pleadings, or was influenced by prejudicial statements of
his fellow jurors, the rule will allow the use of affidavits and testimony
to impeach certain verdicts. For example, where a juror was approached
by a party, his agent, or attorney, or where witnesses or others discussed
facts not in evidence in the presence of a juror, affidavits or testimony
of jurors would be admissible. 39
35 10 Tenn. 60 (1821). In Popino v. McAllister, 7 N.J.L. 46 (1823), the dissenting
opinion states that "cases might occur where they ought to be admitted, and
there was no other source from which the information they contained could be
derived."
3620 Iowa 195 (1866).
3 "Iowa Rule" see: Wright v. Illinois Central and Mississippi Tel. Co.,
20 Iowa 195 (1866), see 8 WIGasORE EVIDENCE 2354 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)
where it is stated that Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio(to corroborate), Oregon, Tennessee, Texas Washington apply the Iowa Rule.
See the following for application of the Iowa Rule- Brackin v. State 31 Ala.
App. 228 14 So.2d 383 (1943), State v. Pearson, 98 Ariz. 133, 402 P.2d 557,
1965), Magid v. Mozo 135 So. 2d 772 (Fla. App. 1966), Oakes v. Peter Pan
Bakers Inc., 258 Iowa 447, 138 N.W.2d 93 (1965) , State v. Rambo, 69 Kan. 777,
77 P 536 (1904), Harris v. State, 24 Neb. 803, 40 N.W 317 (1888) State v.
Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955), James Turner & Sons v. Great No.
Ry., 67 N.D. 347, 272 N.W 489 (1937), State v. Gardner, 230 Ore. 569, 371
P.2d 558 (1962), Stokes v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 269, 305 S.W.2d 779 (1957)
now covered by statute; see TEx. CODE Ciatm. P art. 40.03 (1965), State v.
McChesney, 114 Wash. 113, 194 P 551 (1921).
3s Wright v. Illinois Central and Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195, 210 (1866).
3 See Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874) for a different construction of the Iowa
Rule. This case admits jurors testimony open to corroboration by other jur-
ors ;" but as to overt acts, they are accessible to the knowledge of all the jurors;
if one affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can deny; one cannot disturb
the action of twelve: it is useless to tamper with one, for the eleven may be
heard." Note, 25 U. Cmi. L. Rzv. 362 (1958).
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In justifying the rule on policy grounds, the court distinguished
between the protection of a juror who acted in the legitnmate discharge
of his duty and the protection of a juror who steps beyond "legitimate"
discharge
(W)hen the juror has done an act entirely independent and out-
side of his duty and in violation of it and the law, there can be
no sound public policy which should prevent a court from hear-
ing the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible in order
to administer justice to the party whose rights have been preju-
diced by such unlawful act.
40
The Model Code of Evidence contains a provision similar to the
"Iowa Rule "
301. Testimony of jurors.
Whenever any act, event or condition known to a member of a
petit or grand jury is a subject of lawful inquiry, any witness,
including every member of the jury, may testify to any material
matter, including any statement or conduct or condition of any
member of the jury, whether the matter occurred or existed in
the jury room or elsewhere, and whether during the deliberation
of the jury, or in reaching or reporting its verdict or finding, or
in any other circumstance, except that upon an issue as to the
validity of the verdict or indictment, no evidence shall be received
concerning the effect which anything had upon the mind of a
juror as tending to cause him to assent or dissent from the ver-
dict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which
it was reached. 41
This rule permits the juror to testify to any relevant matter except
his mental processes and the effect which any act or event had upon
his mental operations with reference to the verdict. The Model Code
rule also permits testimony of jurors where a claim has been made that
a mistake occurred in announcing or recording the verdict.
The Preliminary draft of the Proposed Rules of Evidence for
the United States District Courts and Magistrates (hereinafter referred
to as the Proposed Rules of Evidence) also follows the liberality of
the Model Code
Rule 6-06. Competency of Juror as Witness
(b) INQUIRY INTO VALIDITY OF VERDICT OR INDICTMENT
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,
a juror may not testify concerning the effect of anything upon
his or any other juror's mind or emotion as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning
his mental processes in connection therewith. Nor may his affi-
davit or evidence of any statement by him indicating an effect of
this kind be received for these purposes.
42
4
°Wright v. Illinois Central and Mississippi Tel. Co., 20 Iowa 195 at 211.
41 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 301 (1942), (for a discussion of Wisconsin law
interpreting the Code Rule 301 see 1945 Wis. L. REV. 251-52).
42 Col[MoN RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR
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The Advisory Committee notes declare that mental operations and emo-
tional reactions of jurors in arriving at a given verdict are not a proper
subject of inquiry under Rule 6-06(b) However, notwithstanding the
existence of substantial authority in opposition,43 Rule 6-06 recognizes
that the door of the jury room is not a satisfactory dividing point, and
permits disclosure of irregularities occurring in or outside the jury
room. Consistent with the public policy arguments, it is believed that
to allow jurors to testify as to matters other than their own personal
or inner feelings involves no particular hazard to the values sought to
be protected.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence 4 are in accord with the "Iowa
Rule," the Model Code, and the Proposed Rules of Evidence. Rule 41
prohibits evidence which would show that a statement, act, event or
condition influenced the juror to reach his verdict. However, Rule 44,
which is meant to be read in conjunction with Rule 41, prohibits a
construction of Rule 41 which would prohibit a juror from testifying,
as a witness, to conditions or occurrences within or without the jury
room except as expressly limited by Rule 41, if the law of the state
permits such testimony.
In jurisdictions where the "Iowa Rule" or a similar rule has been
adopted, the courts will have to draw a dividing line between "overt
acts"-extraneous conditions or occurrences that bear on the verdict
and matters "inhering in the verdict" itself-the mental and emotional
processes involved in assenting to or dissenting from the verdict. As one
case has indicated,45 the courts may have difficulty drawing a definitive
line between the two. As a result, the conflict between the policies
of protection of individual rights and preservation of the public admin-
istration of justice will be brought sharply into focus in making a deci-
sion.
THE UNITED STATES DisTRICT COURTS AND KAGiSTRATES rule 8-01 (c) (i) and
(ii) (1959).
43See 8 WIGMORE EVIDENCE §2 354 (.&cNaughton Rev. 1961).4 4 UNIFORMi RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 41 and 44 (1952).
Rile 41. Endence to Test a Verdict or Indictment.
Upon an inquiry as to the validity of a verdict or an indictment no evidence
shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condi-
tion upon the mind of a juror as influencing him to assent to or dissent from
the verdict or indictment or concerning the mental processes by which it was
determined.
Rile 44. Testimony of Jurors Not Limited Except by These Rules.
These rules shall not be construed to (a) exempt a juror from testifying as
a witness, if the law of the state permits, to conditions or occurrences either
within or outside of the jury room having a materal bearing on the validity of
the verdict or the indictment, except as expressly limited by Rule 41, (b)
exempt a grand juror from testifying to testimony or statements of a person
appearing before the grand jury, where such testimony or statements are the
subject of lawful inquiry in the action in which the luror is called to testify.
45 State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118 A.2d 812 (1955), Note, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 953(1956) , see also United States v. Furlong, 194 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.) cert. defied,
343 U.S. 950 (1952), Brackin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 228, 14 So. 2d 383 (1943).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
The remaining two classifications of decisions are those which
either extend or limit the rule excluding the testimony or affidavits
of jurors. In the third class the decisions generally relax the rules
concerning admissibility where the affidavit or testimony of the juror
describes objective conduct or "overt acts" of a juror outside the
courtroom. 46 The "self-stultifying testimony" doctrine, which bars the
use of a juror's affidavit or testimony to impeach his own verdict
under all circumstances, is the final classification of the decisions.17
The general rule laid down by Lord Mansfield prohibiting a juror
from impeaching his own verdict has not been free of criticism or even
condemnation. Wigmore, in commenting upon this rule said.
As the common formula has run, a juror's testimony or affi-
davit is not receivable to impeach his own verdict. But this rule
of thumb is in itself neither strictly correct as a statement of the
acknowledged law nor at all defensable upon any principle in
this unqualified form. It is a mere shibboleth and has no in-
trinsic signification whatever.4"
Judge Learned Hand declared that. "(T)he whole subject (granting
of a new trial on the grounds of jury misconduct) has been obscured
apparently beyond hope of clarification, by Lord Mansfiield's often
quoted language in Vasse v. Delaval." 49 But as Hand implies, the repe-
tition of the consecrated rubric offers an easy escape from embarrassing
chores. At least one sarcastic jutification for the continuance of the
general rule has appeared in a dissenting opinion
When such a rule is completed and rounded, the corners
smoothed and the content cohesive and coherent, it is likely to
become a thing in itself, a work of art. It is then like a finely
engineered bridge or completed painting. One hates to disturb
it. Even if knowledge and experience should demonstrate its
obsolescence, one hates to tear it down because it has existed so
long in its original design.5 0
46 Washington Gas Light Co. v. Connolly, 214 F.2d 254 (D.C. Cir. 1954), Amaril-
lo v. Emery, 69 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1934), Bellows Falls Village Corp. v. State
Highway Bd., 190 A.2d 695 (1963), Downs v. Fossey, 144 Kan. 456, 61 P.2
875 (1936), Pierce v. Brennan, 83 Minn. 422, 86 N.W 417 (1901), Palestrom
v. Jacobs, 10 N.J. Super 266, 77 A.2d 183 (1950), Capozzi v. Butterwei, 2 N.J.
Super 593, 65 A.2d 144 (1949), Bainton v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York,
292 N.Y.S.2d 229 (1968), Wicker v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 434, 83
N.E.2d 56 (1948), noted in 10 OHIO ST. L. J. 262 (1949)
4 Brock v. State, 237 Ark, 73, 371 S.W.2d 539 (1963), People v. Evans, 39 Cal.2d
242, 246 P.2d 636 (1952), Alley v. State, 99 Ga. App. 322, 108 S.E.2d 282(1959), State v. Cacavas, 55 Idaho 538, 44 P.2d 1110 (1935) , People v. Straus,
290 Ill. 259, 125 N.E. 339 (1919) , People v. Van Camp, 536 Mich. 593, 97
N.W.2d 726 (1959), State v. Malone, 333 Mo. 594, 62 S.W.2d 909 (1933),
State v. Lewis, 52 Mont. 495, 159 P 415 (1916) , State v. Lewis 59 Nev. 262,
91 P.2d 820 (1939).
48 8. WIGNIOE § 2345 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
49 Jorgensen v. New York Ice Machine Co., 160 F.2d 432, 435 (2nd Cir.) cert.
denied 332 U.S. 764 (1947).SO Kollert v. Cundiff, 50 Cal. 2d 768, 329 P.2d 897, 901 (1958)
[Vol. 53
IV WIscONsIN RULES PRIOR To FoR CREDIT Co. v AmODT
Prior to Ford and Miller, Wisconsin generally excluded affidavits
presented to show error flowing from matters personal to the jurors
which were said to "inhere in the verdict." However, Wisconsin had
indicated approval of allowing affidavits at to misconduct which oc-
curred outside the jury room, and affidavits that charged that the ver-
dict was erroneously recorded.
A. OCCURENCES, CONDITIONS OR STATEMENTS
"INHERING IN THE VERDICT"
Early decisions had declared the following occurrences, conditions
or statements as "inhering in the verdict."
1) Misunderstanding one of the questions of the special verdict,
2) Misunderstanding the effect of the verdict rendered,
3) Assent to the verdict because of weariness or fatigue, and
4) Influence by remarks of other jurors.
1. Juror's Misunderstanding of Questions of a Special Verdict
In Holub v. Cootware,5 1 an affidavit was submitted by a juror stat-
ing that he did not understand a question of the special verdict. The
court, in denying the admissibility of the affidavit, stated that if a verdict
cannot stand because one is willing to state that he misunderstood a
question of the special verdict, it must, by the same reasomng, be set
aside because a juror misunderstood the court's charge or obtained a
mistaken impression from certain testimony
2. Jurors Misunderstanding of the Effect of the Verdict Rendered.
Under no circumstances may a juror be permitted to impeach his
verdict by a later confession that he appreciated the effect of his fiind-
ings, but did not believe the verdict to be correct.52 In Butteris v.
M1fifflin 53 the representative of the deceased employee of the defendant
brought an action to recover for damages allegedly caused by the negli-
gence of the defendant. The defendant had alleged that the deceased
was guilty of contributory negligence. After the closing of the case,
a special verdict was submitted to the jury which contained a question
as to the existence of contributory negligence. The jury found that the
defendant was negligent, that the deceased was guilty of want of due
care which contributed to his death, and that the damages were $2,500.
After the verdict, the jury was polled to determine if the jurors had
found the deceased guilty of contributory negligence. Each juror an-
swered affirmatively. Subsequent to the rendering of the verdict, but
prior to judgment, the plaintiff offered the affidavits of four jurors
stating that these jurors had a different intention from the one expressed
51169 Wis. 176, 170 N.W 939 (1919).
52 Imperio v. State, 153 Wis. 455, 141 N.W 241 (1913).
53 133 Wis. 343, 113 N.W 642 (1907).
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in the verdict and that they were mistaken as to the effect of the finding
the jury actually agreed upon. The trial court then granted plaintiff's
motion setting aside the verdict and granted a new trial on the grounds
that the four jurors did not intend to find the deceased guilty of want
of due care. On appeal the Supreme Court reversed the trial court
decision citing the general rule prohibiting impeachment and holding
that statements of each juror in their affidavit constituted an impeach-
ment of their verdict and not allegations that the written verdict was
incorrect, therefore the case was distinguishable from Wolfgram v.
Schoepke,54 discussed supra. 55 The court held that where jurors had a
different intention from the one expressed in the verdict, or were mis-
taken as to the effect of their finding, either situation results in an
impeachment of their verdict actually agreed upon. This is not a cor-
rection of their verdict but an impeachment of it, such as the law does
not permit.
In State v. Biller,5 6 affidavits were submitted stating that the
jurors had not understood that the case was a criminal case or that a
guilty verdict provided for punishment. The affiants declared that their
only intention in finding the defendant guilty was to provide for reim-
bursement to the state for the defendant's wrongful acts.
The court issued a warning as to the effect of accepting such affi-
davits
"If jurors after being discharged and after mingling with their
friends who have expressed approval or disapproval of the jury's
verdict, are to be allowed to impeach that verdict, the unbiased
evaluation of the evidence which the solemn court proceedings
are intended to facilitate will have ceased to control decisions." 57
The court indicated that if it would allow after-reactions to a final
decision, verdicts would cease to be decisive and jurors would be sub-
jected to post trial chicanery, improper persuasion and more remotely
-bribery In Koss v. Schidtz,58 affidavits were submitted by jurymen
claiming that they desired plaintiff to recover damages but were mis-
informed as to the effect the answer would have on plaintiff's right to
recover. In response, the court stated that evidence taken in open
court, before the jury has separated, is of far greater value than evi-
dence produced weeks later by affidavits after the jurors have been
informed of the gravity of their decision. Finally, in Olson v. Wil-
liams,59 jurors claimed not to have understood the acquiesence question
or the court's instruction concerning it. The court simply stated that
54 123 Wis. 19, 100 N.W 1054 (1904)
55 See page 258, supra.56 262 Wis. 472, 55 N.W.2d 414 (1952).
5 Id. at 477, 55 N.W.2d at 416.
5s Koss v. Schultz, 195 Wis. 243, 218 N.W 175 (1928).
59 Olson v. Williams, 270 Wis. 57, 70 N.W.2d 10 (1955)
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the generally accepted rule is that affidavits of jurors impeaching a
verdict will not be received where the facts sought to be shown are
such as "inhere in the verdict."
3. Jurors Assented Because of Weariness or Fatigue.
Wisconsin has denied the impeachment of a verdict by a juror's
affidavit which alleged that the particular juror assented only because
of weariness and fatigue. In Kink v. Combs,60 a juror submitted an
affidavit that stated as follows
I could not hold out for my opinion that punitive damages
were not warranted from sheer fatigue and I feel that I have
failed to render a true verdict in the case. 61
The court refused to accept the affidavit in that it would seriously
alter the finality attached to jury verdicts and lend to the harassment
of jurors by the losing party.
4. Influence by Remarks of Fellow Jurors.
In three decisions 62 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has refused to
accept an affidavit by a juror or jurors, which alleged that said juror's
answer to the verdict question was not representative of his true belief
but rather was influenced by the remarks of another juror or jurors.
In Owen v. Portage Telephone Company63 a juror declared that he
only agreed and consented to an affimative answer to the contributory
negligence question because he believed a fellow juror (who had, on
some previous occasion, been advised by a distinguished lawyer) that
his answer would be immaterial and would not prevent the plaintiff
from recovery In Frion v. Craig64 three jurors declared that they had
been influenced by a juror who took a strong and partial position in
favor of the defendant. In still another case, Becker v. West Side Dye
Works65 the verdict was attacked by use of jurors' affidavits which de-
clared that the affiants had been influenced by the religious prejudice
of other jurors. In all three decisions the court ruled that the affidavits
presented were not admissible because the reasons of a juror in an-
swering in a particular manner "inhere in the verdict," and as such,
cannot be the basis of an impeachment of a verdict.
B. ERRONEOUS WRITTEN VERDICT
Previous to the Ford ruling, affidavits had been accepted where it
was charged that a verdict had been misrecorded. In Wolfgram v.
60 28 Wis. 2d 65, 135 N.W.2d 789 (1965).
61 Id. at 78, 135 N.W.2d at 796.62 Frion v. Craig, 274 Wis. 550, 80 N.W2d 808 (1957), Becker v. West Side
Dye Works, 172 Wis. 1, 177 N.W 907 (1920), Owen v. Portage Tel. Co., 126
Wis. 412, 105 N.W 924 (1905).
63 126 Wis. 412, 105 N.W 924 (1905).
64274 Wis. 550, 80 N.W.2d 808 (1957).
65 172 Wis. 1, 177 N.W 907 (1902).
66 123 Wis. 19, 100 N.W 1054 (1904).
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Schoepke,66 the jury answered "yes" to a question asking if plaintiff
had been guilty of want of ordinary care which contributed to his in-
juries. The plaintiff produced affidavits of all twelve jurors which de-
clared that all jurors agreed that the plaintiff was not contributorily
negligent, and the insertion "yes" rather than "no" was a mistake. The
jury foreman stated that he intended to write the answer as to find
the plaintiff free of contributory negligence. The court distinguished
the rule of exclusion as to jurors conduct in the proceedings involved
in reaching and agreeing upon the verdict and evidence as to what really
was the verdict agreed upon. The rule which does not allow jurors to
impeach their verdict applies to the agreement which the jurors reached
and not the written paper filed. In comparing a verdict to a written con-
tract the court stated that a writing is not a contract when it fails to
express the agreement to which the minds met and the courts will
freely exercise their power to correct a mistake when the proof leaves
no doubt that the real contract was something else. In regard to ver-
dicts, the court said
That which decides the rights of the parties litigant is the unani-
mous agreement of the jurors. Each party is entitled to such
judgment as results from the agreement. Any other is pre-
sumptively unjust and any rule that necessitates it unreason-
able.6
7
Brophy v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Transport Conpany6 8
limited the exception laid down in Wolfgram to cases where is was
clear upon all testimony that the agreement of the jurors was other
than the written verdict. In Brophy, the jury had apportioned the
negligence as 50% against the minor plaintiff and 50% against the
defendant. The written verdict was read to the jurors and the jurors
declared it to be their unanimous verdict.
Approximately one month after the verdict was rendered, counsel
for the plaintiff submitted an affidavit from each juror stating that they
did not find the plaintiff 50% negligent, but that because of inadver-
tance and mistake the true and actual verdict was not correctly recorded.
The trial court permitted the defendent to take verbatim statements
of each of the jurors. Those statements failed to show that any other
percentage than 50%-50% apportionment was agreed upon. The trial
court denied plaintiff's motion after verdict and entered judgment for
the defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed stating that it was not
67 Id. at 26, 100 N.W at 1057 For other cases holding affidavits acceptable to
correct misrecorded verdict see: Fried v. McGrath, 135 F.2d 833 (App. D.C.
1943), Kelly v. Call, 324 Ill. App. 143, 57 N.E.2d 501 (1944), Heize v. State,
184 Md. 613, 42 A.2d 128 (1945), Randall v. Peerless Motor Car Co., 212
Mass. 353, 99 N.E. 221 (1912), Kennedy v. Stocker, 116 Vt. 98, 70 A.2d 587(1950), 89 C.J.S. Trial § 523 (1955), 53 Am. Jur. Trial 1110 (1945), 8 WIG-
MORE EVIDENCE § 2355 (McNaughton Rev. 1961).
68 251 Wis. 558, 30 N.W.2d 76 (1947).
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convinced that there had been a mistake in recording what, at the
time of the trial, was the jury's finding.
C. MISCONDUCT OF JURY MEMBERS OUTSIDE COURTROOM
Wisconsin, prior to Ford, allowed jurors to impeach their verdict
where misconduct outside the courtroom had been shown. One of the
leading cases which established this exception was Hempton v. State.69
In Hempton, affidavits were accepted that charged that proceedings of
the trial were from day to day published in newspapers with comments
unfavorable to the accused, which jurors were freely permitted to read.
Furthermore, jurors talked and freely mingled with outsiders so as to
have ample opportunity to talk about the case and to hear conversations
between outsiders in respect thereto and to become fully conscious of
public opinion in respect to the trial and the guilt of the accused. The
court stated that the rule of exclusion applied only to affidavits con-
cerning juror conduct in court or deliberating upon the case. Conduct
outside the confines of the courtroom may be established by jurors for
the purpose of impeaching their verdict.
The court in State v. Cooper70 adhered to the rule announced in
Hempton. Affidavits indicated that some of the jurors read a re-
port of the proceedings in the Beloit Daily News and that the testi-
mony of one witness was not correctly reported. However, in State v.
Cooper the court did not apply the exception to the rule of exclusion
because the court determined that nothing in the affidavits indicated
that the jurors were misled by the newspaper account. While the jury
should have been instructed more fully at the beginning of trial that
they should not read newspaper accounts of the trial, the court found no
prejudicial error in reviewing the record made in support of the motion
for a new trial.
The case of Peppercorn v. The City of Black River Falls71 further
countenanced the exception. During the trial, certain jurymen m the case,
without any view having been authorized and without the knowledge
of those representing the defendant, examined the place of the accident
for the purpose of ascertaining the condition of the walk. In Wiscon-
sin, a jury may view the premises at the request of either party when
it appears to the court that such view is necessary to a just decision. 72
The court in accepting the affidavits stated.
jurors must base their findings upon evidence adduced in their
hearing in the court, or upon a view authorized by the court. For
a juror to go out of the court, of his own notion, and make an
inspection of the premises or thing in dispute, will be good
ground for setting aside the verdict 73
69 111 Wis. 127, 86 N.W 596 (1901).
70 4 Wis. 2d 251, 89 N.W.2d 816 (1958).
1189 Wis. 38,61 N.W 79 (1894).
72 WIs. STAT. § 270.20 (1967).
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Thus in summary, the court indicated that the rule of public policy
which excludes the testimony of jurors to impeach their verdicts ex-
tends only to matters taking place during their retirement.
In Wisconsin, every court of record and every judge of such court
has the power to punish by fine and/or imprisonment any neglect or
violation of duty or any misconduct by which the rights or remedies of
a party in an action or proceeding pending or triable may be defeated,
impaired, impeded, or prejudiced. This provision is applicable to per-
sons summoned as jurors for improperly conversing with any party to
an action to be tried or any person in relation to the merits of such
action or for receiving communications from any such party or from
any other person in relation to the merits of such action without imme-
diately disclosing the same to the court. 74
CONCLUSION
In reviewing cases on the impeachment of jury verdicts, two conflict-
ing considerations seem to constantly reoccur-weighing public policy
demanding that verdicts be tamperproof against the rights of the un-
successful party No one would doubt that a blanket acceptance of affi-
davits of impeachment would probably induce after-the-fact inquiries,
jury tampering, interference with private deliberations, prolongation of
litigation, and unsettled verdicts. However, public policy must be bal-
anced against the probable injury to litigants and the supposed ends
attainable in the public administration of justice. A strict rule of ex-
clusion would often suppress the best evidence available of misconduct
and prevent a juror from righting the wrong inflicted upon a litigant.
Where an affidavit alleges misconduct which may have influenced the
finding, exclusion achieves stability of jury verdicts, but only at the
expense of doing justice between the parties. Courts must not only con-
sider public policy reasons but also heed the harm a litigant may be
exposed to if a prejudicial verdict is rendered against him.
The injustice inherent in an automatic application of the Mansfield
rule excluding self-stultifying testimony in all cases has led the courts
in some jurisdictions to adopt a more liberalized view The Iowa Rule,
Model Code, Proposed Rules and Uniform Rules of Evidence are proof
of this liberalization. Statutory exception to the strict rule of exclusion
has been mostly confined to instances where the jurors have been in-
duced to assent by resort to determination by chance.7 5
The newly adopted Wisconsin rule is a strict application of the ex-
clusionary rule. In effect, jurors in Wisconsin may not embark on a
course to impeach their verdict although they may be required to con-
73 89 Wis. at 41, 61 N.W at 80.
74 WIs. STAT. § 295.01 (1967).
75ARK. STAT. § 43-2204 (1964), CAL. CIv. PRO. CODE § 657(2) (1955), IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 10-602(2) (1948), MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-5603(2) (1947)
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firm or deny someone else's attack on their verdict. An attack on the
verdict must originate in one who was not a member of the jury, and
who possesses substantial awareness of the alleged impropriety Such
personal awareness must be derived independently and directly from a
source other than a juror. Unless the subject of the impropriety is
independently verifiable, the verdict of the jury cannot be divorced.
The Wisconsin rule seems analogous to the earlier announced aliunde
rule76 in Ohio whereby there must exist as a condition precedent to
the admission of juror testimony a foundation of evidence given by a
third person relating to the alleged misconduct. The Wisconsin rule
not only excludes the best evidence but in most cases the only evidence
of jury misconduct in utilizing policy consideration as the basis of the
rule.
MARTIN J. GREENBERG
76 Farrer v. State, 2 Ohio St. 54 (1873).
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